Economists disagree about whether competition causes the ideologies of media markets to converge or diverge. This paper analyzes the effect of media competition on the political ideologies of media outlets as well as on the news consumption of the general public. Using the National Annenberg Election Surveys of 2000 and 2004, empirical results show that in markets with only one newspaper, residents who are at ideological extremes may choose not to read a newspaper. However, in competitive markets, residents who are at the extremes are more likely to read a newspaper than in the monopoly case. The results also show that newspaper competition reduces the incentive among those with extreme ideologies to access political information online. These results suggest that readers prefer a newspaper with an ideology close to their own and that newspaper competition will induce newspapers to specialize in different ideologies. * I am very grateful to Brian Knight, Ross Levine and Pedro Dal Bo for their guidance and encouragement. I also thank
Introduction
The social effects of competition have long interested economists. In many markets, such as those for automobiles and the dining industry, it has been shown that competitive environments result in product variety and thus increase consumer welfare.
However, the effect of competition on media markets is more difficult to assess because media markets in general have relatively little competition. In particular, most daily newspapers enjoy monopolies.
1 Regarding the effect of competition on media markets, one of the most intriguing issues is whether an increase in media competition would result in more or less differentiation in the political ideology of media outlets. As no consensus has yet been reached, this paper aims to examine the effect of competition on the political ideology of newspapers and the consumption of news.
Specifically, we would like to know whether newspapers in markets with more than one newspaper will choose the same political ideologies or whether they will specialize in different ideologies.
News media play an essential role in society because individuals need information to make decisions. Political ideology may affect the way that media outlets select news information (Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder, 2007) , and the market structure of the media industry may in turn affect the way newspapers produce ideological content and opinions. In the literature, theories of media bias have different predictions regarding the effect of media competition. Some argue that increased media competition would induce media firms to select common and popular political ideologies because of the pressure to attract more readers and generate more advertising revenue. Another reason for ideological convergence could be that media firms compete on their reputation for truthful and balanced news reporting. From this perspective, we would predict that increased media competition would weaken the connection between consumers' beliefs and the ideologies of their news sources. However, others argue that media firms engaged in price competition cater to consumers' beliefs as 1 The fact that most daily newspapers enjoy a monopoly may be due to the high fixed cost of producing a newspaper; as a result, the number of newspapers is not a linear function of market size (Berry and Waldfogel, 2006) . It could also be because advertisers prefer to buy ads in newspapers with more readers; therefore, a newspaper with fewer readers cannot easily survive.
a product differentiation strategy. In this case, competition would lead to divergent ideologies of media outlets and market segmentation.
In this paper, I first provide a simple model of newspaper competition. The model is based on three assumptions.
(1) Newspapers aim to maximize their readership. (2) Readers prefer news outlets close to their own ideologies. (3) Readers may choose not to read a local newspaper. The model predicts that in a monopoly, newspapers will select the median ideology of the market, and readers at the extremes will be less likely to read the newspaper. In a two-newspaper market, newspapers will specialize in different ideologies and therefore increase the probability of people with extreme ideologies reading a local newspaper. This model has predictions not only on newspaper ideologies but also on news consumption of individuals, which can be tested by the data on newspaper consumption.
I then conduct an empirical analysis of the effect of competition in newspaper markets. While the literature on media contains several theoretical studies on the role of competition, related empirical analysis is relatively limited. This paper con- An alternative way to test whether newspaper competition results in divergence of newspaper ideologies is to estimate the effect of newspaper competition on the incentive to obtain political information online. Assuming that news sources with similar ideologies are substitutes, if newspaper competition causes newspapers to specialize in different ideologies, then newspaper competition will reduce the incentive for people at ideological extremes to obtain political news online.
The empirical results support the model's prediction that competition causes newspaper ideologies to diverge. People who identify themselves as politically moderate are more likely to read a local newspaper than those at the extremes, and newspaper competition encourages more people with extreme ideologies to read newspapers.
The results also show that newspaper competition reduces the incentive for people at the extremes to access political information online. The empirical evidence suggests that readers prefer a newspaper with an ideology that is close to their own and that newspaper competition will cause newspapers to specialize in different ideologies, satisfying the news demands of people with opposing ideologies.
Related Literature
Most theories of media bias try to explain where media bias originates and how it is affected by competition between media firms. Under the assumption that consumers value news accuracy, media competition may force media outlets to deliver more accurate information (Besley and Prat, 2002; Anderson and McLaren, 2005) . In contrast, media firms may increase media bias to cater to consumers' beliefs as a product differentiation strategy (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) . Moreover, sources of revenue and consumers' advertisement preferences may also affect the ideologies of newspapers under competition pressure (Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac, 2002; Anderson and Gabszewicz, 2005 ).
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) present a theory of media bias in which consumers appreciate unbiased news reporting and will choose a media firm based upon the firm's reputation. Consumer judgment of a news outlet depends on both prior beliefs and on feedback received after the news report. Media competition will increase the feedback that consumers receive and will therefore help them to identify which news outlet is more unbiased. Thus, media competition will weaken the connection between consumers' beliefs and the ideology of news reports. When beliefs of consumers are heterogeneous, the effect of competition is ambiguous. Both segmented equilibrium and convergence equilibrium can exist, but the segmented equilibrium will not exist if the competition-induced feedback that consumers receive is high enough. Gentzkow and Shapiro also provide empirical evidence from local TV markets that presidential
candidates' sound bites are more balanced in the markets where there are more local TV news programs, suggesting that media competition reduces media bias. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) present another theory of media competition and media bias. Mullainathan and Shleifer assume that readers hold beliefs that they like to see confirmed in the news they consume, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. Analogous to the standard Hotelling model, when deciding the optimal news slant, the price effect dominates the market share effect until firms are very far apart. 2 Therefore, duopolist newspapers will differentiate themselves by reporting extreme news so that they can charge higher prices. In this case, if readers do not have access to all news sources, competition will make the relation between readers' beliefs and the ideologies of their news sources stronger.
Considering how sources of revenue affect the ideologies of newspapers under com-2 In the standard Hotelling model with price competition, two firms will present maximum differentiation in order to have larger monopoly power over consumers (Tirole, 1998) . In general, the factors of product differentiation are: the costs of disutility, the demand elasticity, the number of firms, and the density of consumers (Brenner, 2001 4 Considering the fact that more than 60 percent of the revenue of newspapers comes from advertising, it is reasonable to assume that newspapers are trying to maximize market share rather than the revenue from selling newspapers. One piece of evidence to support this assumption is that the New York Times canceled the fee for the editorial section in 2007 in order to maximize market share.
Model Setup
In our model, there are one or two newspapers, and the population of consumers is normalized to 1. The goal of newspapers is to maximize market share. Consumer i has ideology c i , which is symmetrically distributed with mean 0 with cumulative density function F (·). Newspapers are sold at fixed price p. The utility of reading a newspaper j with ideology e j to consumer i is given by:
This utility is larger when the ideology of the newspaper is closer to the ideology of the reader. Let U i0 be the utility from outside options if consumer i chooses not to read a newspaper. Consumer i will read newspaper j if and only if the utility from reading newspaper j is greater than the utility of reading other newspapers or the utility of not reading a newspaper:
Case I: Monopoly Newspaper
We first consider the case when there is only one newspaper in the market. The demand for the newspaper is:
where
Because the goal of the newspaper is to maximize its market share, the optimal ideology e * will satisfy the following first-order condition:
where f is the probability density function of consumer ideology. Therefore, the optimal choice of ideology, e * is 0 when the ideological distribution of consumers is symmetric with mean 0. Also, consumers with ideologies greater than l or less than −l will not read the newspaper.
Case II: Two Newspapers
Now we assume that there are two newspapers, 1 and 2, with ideologies e 1 and e 2 in the market. Without loss of generality, we assume that e 1 < e 2 . Let x be the ideology of the consumer who is indifferent to reading newspaper 1 and not reading a newspaper, let x be the ideology of the consumer who is indifferent to reading newspaper 2 and outside options, and let x * be the ideology of the consumer who is indifferent to reading newspaper 1 and newspaper 2. The demand for newspaper 1 and newspaper 2, respectively, can be represented as:
If the utility from outside options is extremely low, then almost every consumer will read a local newspaper. Thus we will get a result similar to the median voter theorem. As long as the utility from outside options is high enough, newspapers will face the trade-off between losing some of the median consumers or losing some of the extreme consumers when deciding the ideology. Thus we have the following proposition. The detailed proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition. Let l be a − U i0 t and k be f 
The proposition says that whether newspapers choose different ideologies depends on parameters a, t, U i0 , and the distribution of consumers' ideologies. If the utility from outside options, U i0 , is high enough, two newspapers will choose two different ideological positions, l − k and k − l. In this case, the distance between these two ideological positions will be larger if consumers are more sensitive to newspaper ideology, if the utility from outside options is higher or if the distribution of consumers' ideologies is flatter. Given these two ideological positions, consumers with ideologies larger than k or smaller than −k will not read a newspaper. While consumers with ideologies between l and k or between −k and −l will not read a newspaper in the monopoly case, these consumers will read a newspaper in the case of competition.
Predictions
The model is based on the assumptions that the goal of newspapers is to maximize their readership and that consumers may choose not to read a local newspaper.
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The model thus predicts that, in the case of a monopoly, newspapers will select the median ideology. In the case of competition, when the utility of outside options is high enough, newspapers will choose different ideologies.
Regarding consumers' choices of newspaper, the model provides two predictions.
First, in the case of monopoly, readers whose ideologies are away from the median ideology are less likely to read a newspaper. Second, consumers with extreme ideologies are more likely to read a local newspaper when there is newspaper competition.
These predictions will be tested using the data illustrated in the next section.
Data
This section describes the data sources, defines key variables and presents graphs and a simple test.
Newspaper Competition
In order to investigate the effect of newspaper competition on the ideologies of newspapers, it is necessary to define the market area and measure newspaper competition.
In the U.S., most daily newspapers are city newspapers, and a few newspapers are county specific. Because the circulation area of a daily newspaper is usually larger than a city, the newspaper market is defined as either an MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or a county.
5 The model does not consider the possible influence of owner preferences. Because newspapers in a monopoly market have more monopoly power, the influence of owner preference on newspapers' ideologies could be larger in single-newspaper markets.
Newspaper competition is measured by the number of newspapers in the city. Because one MSA could have several cities with one or zero newspapers, the newspaper competition measure does not account for all available newspapers in the market.
The variation of newspaper competition relies on whether there is any city with more than one newspaper in the market area.
In some multiple-newspaper cities, different newspapers have the same owners or have an agreement to cooperate in printing and distribution. Nevertheless, because these newspapers still have different editorial staffs, they are treated in the same manner as independent newspapers under competition. Business and foreign-language newspapers are excluded when counting the number of newspapers in the market.
Newspaper Reading and Political Demographics
The data concerning individuals' news consumption and political demographics are 
Local Newspaper Reading
The survey asked respondents which newspaper they had read most in the past week. If the newspaper they had read most was a national newspaper or an interna-tional newspaper, the individual was defined as not reading a local newspaper. However, there are several major daily newspapers that circulated outside their MSA. For example, the Boston Globe circulates both in Boston and in the Providence MSA.
Because the newspaper competition measure does not consider all the newspapers available in the market, the readers of such widely distributed major daily newspapers are defined as not reading a local newspaper if they live outside of the MSA where the newspaper is published.
Political Ideology of the Respondents
The political ideology of the respondent was self-reported into one of the four following categories: very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, or very conservative. I recoded the ideologies from -2 to 2; very liberal is coded as -2, and very conservative is coded as 2. For each respondent, I defined their absolute extreme index as:
where ideo im is the ideology of individual i in the market m.
To reflect the degree of ideological extreme in their market area, I also defined the relative extreme index of individual i in market m as:
where mean m is the mean ideology of the market m.
Presence of High-speed Internet
The quality and the price of the Internet may directly affect the utility of accessing information from the Internet and therefore provide consumers with more news sources. As a result, the growth in the availability of high-speed Internet may directly affect the readership of newspapers.
In this paper, the number of high-speed internet providers is used as a proxy for the 
Graphs and A Test
Graph 1 presents the ideological distribution of residents in a one-newspaper market,
Hartford, as well as the ideological distribution of readers of the Hartford Courant.
Comparing theses two distributions, we see that the ideology distribution of the read- We calculate each newspaper's ideology by taking the mean ideology of its readers. We then use this information to derive an F-statistic and test the hypothesis that newspapers in a two-newspaper market target individuals with different ideologies. The detail of the derivation is provided in Appendix 2. The null hypothesis is that all newspapers target the mean market ideology. The alternative hypothesis is that newspapers in a two-newspaper market target readers with different ideologies.
The F-statistic, 1.9, is greater than the critical value at 5 percent significance, 1.42, and therefore rejects the null hypothesis that all newspapers target the mean of the market's ideological distribution. This provides evidence to support the prediction that newspapers will specialize in different ideologies in two-newspaper markets. The next section provides empirical analysis based on individuals' choices of newspaper.
Empirical Analysis
This section presents the empirical analysis to test the predictions from the theoretical model, examining the relationship between the structure of the media market and the 6 The data are available from 1999 for every half year.
consumption of news. The model predicts that in a market with only one newspaper, the newspaper chooses the ideology near the median resident, and people whose ideologies differ from the median resident are less likely to read a local newspaper.
However, when there is more than one newspaper in the market, newspapers will specialize in different ideologies, and the probability of reading a local newspaper for those who are at the extremes will increase.
Our empirical analysis has several parts. The first part restricts the sample to respondents in one-newspaper markets and tests whether respondents with extreme ideologies are more likely to read a local newspaper. The second part investigates whether newspaper competition increases the probability of reading a local newspaper. To exclude alternative interpretations, market fixed-effect specifications, an instrumental variable method, and a falsification test for consumption of nonpolitical news are used. The third part tests whether newspaper competition reduces the incentive to obtain political information online.
The Case of a One-newspaper Market
The first prediction of the model on newspaper consumption is that people at the extremes are less likely to read a local newspaper in a single-newspaper market.
To test this prediction, the simplest specification is a probit or linear probability specification. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent reads a newspaper or not. Independent variables are variables that represent the ideologies of respondents and other control variables that may affect the probability of reading a local newspaper, including education, income, age, and gender. These results suggest that very liberal residents in a relatively conservative town are less likely to read a local newspaper because the ideology of the newspaper is more distant from their own. It could also mean that, in general, those at the extremes in the market demand less local news. However, if people at either end of the political spectrum simply demand less local news, newspaper competition should not have larger effects on the probability of reading a local newspaper for people at the extremes in the market relative to those not at the extremes. Therefore, analyzing the effect of competition may help us to distinguish between those two possible reasons. To quantify further the effect of competition, I use the whole sample to estimate the differential effect of newspaper competition on the probability of reading a local newspaper. Using the ideological dummy variables in column (3), the result shows that competition increased the probability of those who are very conservative reading a local newspaper. In column (4), the interaction term of the absolute extreme index and the number of newspapers is positive, indicating that newspaper competition has a larger effect on newspaper reading for people who are at the extremes.
The Effect of Newspaper Competition
In terms of magnitude, on average, six newspapers will erase the gap of local newspaper readership between people with different ideologies. These results support the hypothesis that readers prefer a newspaper with an ideology close to their own and that newspaper competition will make newspapers specialize in different ideologies.
Alternative Explanation -Heterogeneous News Demand
One concern of the above interpretation involves endogeneity in the number of newspapers in a market. The number of newspapers may be related to an unobservable news demand. Specifically, it may be positively correlated to a demand for news among people at the extremes. In this case, we will observe a spurious correlation between newspaper competition and newspaper readership among those at the ideological extremes. Therefore, I use a market fixed-effect specification, an instrumental variable and a falsification test to address this concern.
A. Market Fixed-effect Specification
One way to account for this concern is to rely on the change in competition over time by including market fixed effects. In the market fixed-effect specification, the variation of newspaper competition comes from the change from 2000 to 2004. Table   4 column (1) presents the results with market fixed effects using the absolute extreme index. Compared with the results from the pooled cross-section results in Table 3 The identification assumption for the market fixed-effect specification to be unbiased is that the change in newspaper competition should not be related to a change in demand for news among people at the extremes. To investigate factors that may affect newspaper competition at the market level, I use OLS and fixed-effect models in Table 5 . The dependent variable is the number of newspapers in the market. Col-umn (1) presents the results of cross-section estimation, and column (2) Researchers have investigated factors that contributed to the growth of high-speed
Internet. As Greenstein and Prince (2006) demonstrated, in the earliest years of broadband internet access (prior to 2003), it was very much supply driven in the sense that supply-side issues were the main determinants of broadband internet availability and hence adoption. Specifically, highly populated areas were more profitable because of economies of scale and lower last-mile expenses.
8 While the early stage of high-speed Internet focused on metropolitan areas and areas with higher income, the diffusion process makes it such that the growth rate is unlikely to be positively correlated with a change in news demand among those with extreme ideologies.
B. Instrument Variable
Another way to address the concern is to use the number of professional sporting teams in the market as an instrumental variable. The number of professional sporting teams in a market is related to the demand for sports news and therefore to the number of newspapers in the market. However, the number of professional sporting teams should not relate to the relative demand for news between those at the extremes and those with moderate ideologies because the demand for sports news should not relate to individuals' ideologies. Therefore, using the number of professional sporting teams in the market can help us identify the differential effect of newspaper competition for people with different ideologies. First-stage results based on the instruments are reported in Table 6 . Secondstage results appear in Table 7 . Compared with the results from pooled cross-section specifications and market fixed-effect specifications, the coefficient of the interaction 8 Greenstein and Prince (2006) found that the diffusion of dial-up spread quickly because it relied on the existing phone line infrastructure. 9 The number of professional sporting teams includes teams in four major leagues: the National Football League, the Major Baseball League, the National Basketball Association and the National Hockey League.
term is larger. However, similar to the previous results, 6.2 newspapers will remove the gap in local newspaper readership between people with different ideologies.
C. Political News vs. Nonpolitical News
Clearly, because the number of sporting teams could relate to the demand for nonpolitical news and therefore to the demand for newspapers, distinguishing demand for political news and nonpolitical news will help us understand the change in newspaper demand caused by competition.
In 2004, in addition to asking respondents which newspaper they read most in the past week, the ANES survey also asked respondents whether they got political information about the presidential campaign from the newspaper they read. The exact survey question is the following: "During the past week, how much attention do you pay to newspaper articles about the campaign for president -a great deal of attention, some, not too much, or no attention at all." Therefore, we can split local newspaper readers into political information readers and nonpolitical information readers by their answers. Local newspaper readers who answered "a great deal of attention" and "some" are coded as political readers, and those who answered "not too much" or "no attention" are coded as nonpolitical readers.
In Table 7 , columns (2) and (3) show that the effect of newspaper competition has a larger effect on the probability of being a political newspaper reader among those at the extremes. However, newspaper competition does not have a differential effect on the probability of being a nonpolitical newspaper reader.
The results suggest that people at the extremes increase their demand for political news as there are more newspapers in the market, but their demand for nonpolitical news does not change. This may indicate that the differential effect of newspaper competition that we observed from the OLS, market fixed-effect, and IV specifications are most likely caused by the change in political news. If newspaper competition makes newspapers differentiate in other aspects, this comparison can help us rule out the case that people at the extremes are more sensitive to changes other than political ideologies, such as the amount of sports news or newspaper quality.
Reverse Causality
So far in this paper, the ideologies of individuals are seen as not affected by the newspaper they read. This section provides discussion of the related literature and how this would change the interpretation of empirical results in this paper.
There is some evidence showing that the media may affect voting behavior (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan, 2006) ; however, there is limited evidence that the media will affect the political ideologies of individuals. Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2006) argue that the increase in observed partisan behavior is not due to a fundamental change of voters' political preference. Rather, they argue that it is due to the different information that voters received because the ideological distribution has been stable over recent years, but political opinions become more diverse. Moreover, they argued that in 2004, Bush and Kerry supporters held vastly different those beliefs that were influenced by the media, relative to their differences in core beliefs (e.g., abortion), which are less influenced by the media.
If newspapers can affect readers' ideologies, the OLS estimates in the last section could be caused by reverse causality. The OLS results still show that, in equilibrium, newspapers under competition have different ideologies. However, we cannot make an inference about whether readers prefer a newspaper consistent with their prior beliefs.
The variation of competition in the fixed-effect specification is the change in competition from 2000 to 2004. Because ideologies are less likely to be affected by newspapers significantly within four years, the results from the fixed-effect specification is less sensitive to the possible effect of newspapers on ideologies. Because the estimates from the OLS and fixed-effect specifications are similar, the potential problem of reverse causality is not serious.
Effect of Newspaper Competition on Obtaining Information Online
If news sources with similar ideologies are substitutes and newspaper competition will make newspapers specialize in different ideologies, then newspaper competition may affect the incentive for people at the extremes to get political information online. Table 8 an ideology that is closer to their own and that newspaper competition will make 10 The exact survey question is: "How many days in the past week did you access information about the campaign for president online?" Some respondents are asked, alternatively : "How many days in the past week did you read information about the campaign for president online?" newspapers specialize in different ideologies, satisfying the news demand for people with opposing ideologies.
From the ANES survey, we can calculate the mean ideology of the readers of each newspaper. We are interested in testing whether ideologies of newspapers in a twonewspaper city target different groups of readers, as the model in this paper predicts.
The null hypothesis is that newspapers in two-newspaper markets target the middle of the ideological distribution in their markets. The alternative hypothesis is that newspapers in two-newspaper markets target different groups of readers. Assume that every newspaper has the same ability to target the majority of readers in its market. Under the null hypothesis, ideologies of newspaper i in market m can be represented as follows:
where µ m is the mean ideology of the market, and ε im is i.i.d. normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 .
Suppose that there are N 1 newspapers in a one-newspaper market and N 2 newspapers in a two-newspaper market. For any newspaper in a one-newspaper market, we will have:
Similarly, for newspaper i and j in a two-newspaper market:
Therefore, we can derive a statistic that is distributed as an F-distribution with degrees of freedom N 2 and N 1 :
Graph 1 
